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Abstract 
This essay evaluates the question of the ‘complex’ in a range of scientific, political and  
psychoanalytic contexts, asking not only where lines of connection and demarcation occur  
among specific distributions of meaning, value, theory and practice; but also probing the  
psychoanalytic corpus, notably Freud’s writings on the notion of a ‘complex’, in order to  
reframe various implications of the idea that this term tends to resist its own utilisation as both  
an object and form of analysis.    
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I. 
 
From the mid- to late-twentieth century onwards, the notion of complexity gathered  
momentum as a new way of doing science. The modelling of complex systems intersected  
with new developments in information theory, chaos theory and network theory (as well as  
innovations in other areas) in such a way as to define and address non-linear and non- 
mechanical systems problems across a number of disciplinary fields. Mathematicians,  
physicists, computer scientists, engineers, neuroscientists, molecular biologists,  
meteorologists, economists and social scientists have all benefited from the new approaches  
made possible by complexity, developing powerful analytic and computational tools used in a  
wide range of academic and non-academic settings.
1
  While the origins of complexity theory  
can be traced back to forms of thought from earlier periods that arguably made its emergence  
possible, and while it is undoubtedly composed of a variety of theoretical approaches for  
which the prospect of unification or integration is still some way off, nonetheless the traction  
that complexity has attained seems a singularly modern phenomenon. During the past  
century, however, this terminology has gained ground against a backdrop of various  
uses of the word in a number of discursive fields, which at first glance seem  
distinct, even though one might readily trace connections between its ‘scientific’  
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production and developments in certain technologico-political, governmental and socio- 
cultural fields, as a rich critical literature testifies.
2
 The term was imported into the  
political sphere most famously through the introduction of the phrase ‘military-industrial  
complex’, popularized after Eisenhower’s farewell presidential address of 1961, which  
seemed to align with the comparative dominance of structural perspectives in the post-war  
period, and which provided a means of critical interpretation and indeed a basis for activist  
resistance centred not just on forms of government power but on an entire system of social,  
political and economic control. (Perhaps ironically, this is reflected in the fact that it was an  
outgoing U.S. president that alerted his people to the existence of just such a ‘complex’.) In  
the realm of human psychology, meanwhile, the notion of a ‘complex’, deriving largely from  
psychological and psychoanalytic forms of thought, acquired increasing explanatory power or  
at any rate widespread discursive usage where the problem of personality disorders was  
concerned. But both these examples of use made possible big claims about human life,  
individually and collectively; about what organized, determined, motivated or afflicted it.  
 
As we will see, despite the comparative specificity of each of these utilizations of the word,  
their discursive exercise often entailed interesting elements of overlap (for instance,  
Eisenhower’s references to the ‘military-industrial complex’ seem increasingly to  
psychologize the phenomena to which he alludes). Nevertheless, it would doubtless be  
possible to argue the relative specificity of these three major forms of terminology we  
have identified—all based on the same or similar words—by locating them in terms of the  
specific distribution of structural or systemic thinking that applies in each case, the particular  
formation of which enables or institutes each, but which also forms a resistant limit to the  
self-definition of each. (How systematic or non-systematic, structured or non-structured,  
holistic or non-holistic, predictive or non-predictive could or should each approach be?) If the  
terms ‘complexity’ and ‘complex’ have established a fairly major foothold in the way we  
think and talk about ourselves and our world (scientifically, politically, psychologically, etc.),  
the fact that they have been used in different ways across the domains of human knowledge,  
enquiry and practice probably says as much about the conceptual tensions as about the  
possible connections or configurations to which they give rise. That said, what potentially  
separates or divides them—how to handle the question of systems—is surely also what also  
links or aligns them, or at any rate what polices their borders, and manages passage across, as  
much as marks their boundaries.  
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II. 
 
One of the earliest and most memorable recorded uses of the phrase ‘military-industrial 
complex’ can be found in President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1961 farewell speech to the 
American people. Looking back over a half-century of distinguished public service that also 
saw the world embroiled in a series of horrific conflicts, Eisenhower is swift to set his 
remarks squarely in the post-war context. He recognizes the growing strength, over the 
course of his political career, of the U.S. as an international superpower. Its military prowess, 
industrial productivity, economic wealth and political might are acknowledged as important 
co-requisites of its moral leadership in the world. But at the same time they are seen as a 
potential threat to precisely those values that, for Eisenhower, make America great: ‘free 
government’, ‘liberty, dignity, and integrity’, ‘human betterment’, and so forth. Showing a 
prescient sense of the near-permanent crisis that would come to define global history after the 
Second World War, Eisenhower worries that America might profit from, perhaps even 
exploit, such crises in the interests of even greater power, but that in the process it may alter 
its personality forever. Ever-increasing spending on national defences coupled with spiralling 
investment in national research programmes intended to maintain the competitive advantage 
of the U.S. over its international enemies and rivals risks unbalancing the very character of 
the United States. The post-war ‘military-industrial complex’ that arises from and fuels this 
situation jeopardises the balance of private and public interests on which the nation is 
founded. Balance, indeed, becomes a crucial and thus frequently repeated term in the address: 
balance between the interests of the individual and the nation, between current 
preoccupations and a lasting concern for the future, between desire and duty, and so on. 
‘Good judgement’ is required to keep this balance; without it, the nation will indeed become 
‘unbalanced’, in more senses than one. If the language of the ‘military-industrial complex’ 
registers the growing importance of structural perspectives within post-war political thought 
and discourse (albeit those that may potentialize critical points of view, even from the 
Presidential office), then at the same time this ‘military-industrial complex’ is described in 
terms that undoubtedly seem increasingly ‘psychological’ in nature. For such a ‘military-
industrial complex’ will have potentially ‘grave consequences’ if ‘an alert and knowledgeable 
citizenry’ that it precisely puts at risk is not consciously and deliberately maintained. The 
moral and mental health of the nation—its very sanity—is as much in danger, we are made to 
feel, as its organizational or structural ‘balance’. And when this ‘balance’ is registered in 
terms of a battle for the heart and soul of America, the struggle of an ‘alert and 
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knowledgeable citizenry’ against occult forces that are more or less subterranean, and more 
or less irresistible, plays itself out on a terrain that is undeniably presented as a ‘psychic’ one, 
as much as it is political or social or cultural.   
 
Eisenhower almost tangibly shudders at the sudden and unprecedented development of a 
‘permanent armaments industry of vast proportions’. He is awestruck by the massive post-
war outlay on ‘military security’. It is as if the President himself—the figurehead of the 
nation and custodian of its values—is thrown off-balance by those terrifying forces that he 
himself, as representative of the national psyche, has been unable to control or even foresee. 
The interests of the ‘military-industrial complex’ increasingly conflict with those of ‘free 
government’, and threaten to overpower democratic processes and liberties through the 
‘acquisition of unwarranted influence’, in much the same way that Jekyll turns into Hyde. We 
stand on the brink of a nightmare in which America’s ‘unconscious’ might overwhelm 
national consciousness itself. In the realm of science, the clear-minded personality of the 
inventor as American pioneer has been usurped and superseded by an inhuman ‘task force’ of 
highly funded research-workers devoted to the instrumental value of technological 
development. The university, once a haven of ‘free ideas’, is beset by nationally-sponsored 
research programmes that are increasingly ‘formalized’ and ‘complex’ (thus, without moral 
direction or compass). The spirit of ‘discovery’ and the value of ‘intellectual curiosity’ are 
violently displaced by machinic laboratories and computerized operations. And the irony 
remains that the much-needed ‘balance’ which might serve as a corrective to this state of 
affairs is precisely what is eroded by this state of affairs. If it is the task of the statesman ‘to 
mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces’—a task in which Eisenhower, by his 
own admission, has singularly failed—then the 1961 address reads not only as the farewell 
speech of an elder statesman, but as the swansong of statesmanship itself.  Our future, the 
future of our children, is increasingly mortgaged away. The prospect of an ‘insolvent 
phantom of tomorrow’ looms as we desperately over-exploit our resources in the present. As 
much as its vital importance is urgently asserted, ‘balance’ already seems lost, a thing of the 
past. Hopes for its guardianship of the future look merely nostalgic. It is hard to know how 
‘the proud confederation of mutual trust and respect’ that for Eisenhower seems to 
characterize the American tradition can withstand the onset of a ‘community of dreadful fear 
and hate’. Peace is far from won, all that can be said is that war has been temporarily 
avoided. In the meantime, Eisenhower withdraws proudly—and with an obvious sense of 
relief—into his newfound private citizenship, finding there the personal values (faith, charity, 
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goodness) that once supposedly founded a nation, but which are now elevated only in retreat. 
(And, to take Eisenhower’s text at its word, such flight promises descent into madness as 
much as sane refuge.) The ‘military-industrial complex’, it seems, is not just a structural 
formation—an elaborate system of complexly interrelated parts—but also the figure of a 
certain psychological condition, a mental state. It is not just an operative organizational 
arrangement, but the agent or mechanism of collapse. 
 
Despite its prescience in some regards, one may still wonder why we should revisit this scene 
from long ago, especially when the term ‘military-industrial complex’ has historically 
flourished—and more recently faded—in its capacity as mainly a term of general 
descriptiveness or even sweeping polemical value, rather than as a category of sound analytic 
or academic worth. (The fortunes of this phrase were perhaps predictable enough, given the 
direction and tone of Eisenhower’s remarks.) And yet the question of whether the term 
encourages or resists explanatory possibility, whether it facilitates or undermines political 
consciousness, whether it provokes or restricts rational thought (or more complexly, both) is 
rather in the nature of the problem of the ‘complex’ itself—a problem that continues to be 
ongoing. It registers itself, for instance, in more recent engagements with the term. For 
instance, more than forty years after Eisenhower’s address, Noam Chomsky  has argued that 
‘military-industrial complex’ is a misnomer in the sense that militarization or the ‘military-
industrial’ is just one form that industrial society has taken as a pretext for its economic 
objectives (Chomsky, 2004). (One might argue that ‘industrial’ society is equally a pretext 
for capitalism, rather than its formative ‘core’). Chomsky, then, offers a repudiation of the 
term in favour of a more penetrating and perspicacious analysis, one which restores analytic 
sanity against the backdrop of what is seen as a rather imprecise and ambiguous concept. As 
much as an idea as a fact, the ‘military-industrial complex’ is to be rejected as an overly 
sprawling configuration that needs critical policing in the interests of properly lucid political 
thought. (Although, as I’ve just suggested, Chomsky’s own retention of the ‘industrial’ risks 
a certain ironic repetition of the problem he seeks to clarify.) Here, like the post-war 
American citizenry evoked so optimistically by Eisenhower, it is surely in his capacity as an 
‘alert’ and ‘knowledgeable’ subject that Chomsky finds himself able to resist the ‘creep’ or 
spread of the complex’s insidious logic. At the other end of the spectrum, meanwhile, Slavoj 
Žižek ventures an extension or rather modification of the term amid a deepening of its 
psychological resonances (Žižek, 2008). Writing about the arrest of Radovan Karadzic in the 
aftermath of the conflicts that saw the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, Žižek speaks of a 
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‘military-poetic complex’ in which the amateurish verse of Karadzic—a would-be poet—
sheds light on the psychology as much as the politics of ethnic cleansing. Karadzic is 
described as a ‘ruthless political and military leader’, but was also—as Žižek reminds us—‘a 
psychiatrist by profession’. The ‘complex’ which helps to explain the phenomenon for which 
Karadzic might stand as a representative figure—one which connects poetry, psychology, and 
political and military power—is understood very much in terms of Žižek’s own take on 
psychoanalysis. Karadzic’s poetry thus represents: 
 
the obscene call of the superego: all prohibitions should be suspended so that the 
subject might enjoy a destructive orgy without end. The superego is the ‘godhead’ 
which forbids the people nothing. Such a suspension of moral prohibitions is a crucial 
feature of ‘postmodern’ nationalism. It turns on its head the cliché according to which 
passionate ethnic identification restores a firm set of values and beliefs amid the 
insecurity of global secular society, and serves instead as the facilitator of a barely 
concealed ‘You may!’ It is today’s apparently hedonistic and permissive society that is, 
paradoxically, more and more saturated by rules and regulations (restrictions on 
smoking and drinking, rules against sexual harassment etc), so that the notion of a 
passionate ethnic identification, far from demanding further restraint, functions instead 
as a liberating call: ‘You may!   
 
Whether or not one has any sympathy with Žižek’s insights and approach, it is worth noting 
that at the point where the ‘complex’ extends rather than contracts itself, we are once more 
not only in the midst of an operative organizational arrangement, as I put it earlier, but also a 
psychological understanding of relationships of power. (Although, even where it contracts 
itself, as in Chomsky’s example, the competing forces of rational egoity and ironic repression 
may still be detected.) So it’s not that I want to ‘psychologise’ the term, per se; more that it 
remains difficult if not impossible to sustain its usage without some degree of psychological 
‘drift’, as it were (whether or not it is purged or augmented in these terms).  
 
III. 
 
There is a third contribution made by the Swiss School, probably to be ascribed entirely to 
Jung, which I do not value so highly as others do whose concern with these matters is more 
remote. I refer to the theory of ‘complexes’… It has neither itself produced a psychological 
theory, nor has it proved capable of easy incorporation into the context of psycho-analytic 
theory. The word ‘complex’, on the other hand, had become naturalized, so to speak, in 
psycho-analytic language; it is a convenient and often indispensable term for summing up a 
psychological state descriptively. None of the other terms coined by psycho-analysis for its 
own needs has achieved such widespread popularity or been so misapplied to the detriment 
of the construction of clearer concepts. Analysts began to speak among themselves of a 
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‘return of a complex’ where they meant a ‘return of the repressed’, or fell into the habit of 
saying ‘I have a complex against him’, where the only correct expression would have been 
‘a resistance against him’. 
    
Sigmund Freud, ‘On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement’ (1914)3 
 
Looking back on psychoanalysis’s early history near the beginning of the first Great War in  
Europe, Freud takes time to formulate some critical remarks about the idea of a complex, which  
at this point he attributes almost entirely to Jung, thus effectively distancing himself from  
responsibility for its entry into the psychoanalytic lexicon. Not for the first time, Freud is rather  
dismissive of the term, at any rate downplaying the contribution it has made to genuine  
psychoanalytic categories and forms of thought.  For Freud, the word ‘complex’ has unfortunately  
succumbed to the inaccuracies and simplifications for which the popularization of an interest in  
psychology is largely responsible (although, here, the casual misuse by analysts themselves is the  
object of even sharper reproach).  Freud feels that this word in its habitual usage somewhat dilutes  
and distorts more rigorous psychoanalytic terms, in particular ‘repression’ and ‘resistance’, which  
for him have much greater theoretical and explanatory force. (Jung is targeted for equivocating  
over this essential connection of the ‘complex’ to unconscious processes and materials.) And yet  
the term is not entirely abandoned. Instead, it retains an at times ‘indispensable’ value in precisely  
its descriptive capacity, which one might take to mean its ability to evoke precisely the  
complexities of a given psychological state in more or less summary form. In a certain sense,  
what damns the idea or discourse of the ‘complex’—its seductive generality or catch-all quality— 
is thus also what saves it, partially at least (and Freud is far from guiltless when it comes to using  
the term ‘descriptively’ in several places in his writing). Here, then, we find an interesting  
ambivalence displayed towards the very concept or quasi-concept of the ‘complex’ which surely  
invites further investigation, not least since by resisting psychoanalytic theory in its proper form,  
the word ‘complex’ actually performs that for which it is purportedly an unfortunate misnomer:  
resistance itself. If the term is of little psychological value other than as an inexact yet eye- 
catching byword, how are we to explain Freud’s hesitation in dismissing it completely, especially  
when the grounds for its retention are precisely those which would seem to demand it be banished  
from psychoanalytic parlance altogether? Why keep it, when the rather slight reason to do so is  
probably also a fairly compelling reason to discard it? And why, in reference to this term, does  
Freud’s dissatisfaction with the popularization of psychological thinking outside of  
psychoanalysis ‘proper’ so quickly revert to criticism of analysts themselves? As we will see,  
Freud, no less than other figures associated with the movement, was fond of identifying and  
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naming complexes: might it be that psychoanalysis—Freud, even—has a ‘complex complex’ that  
remains as tenacious as it is problematic, as hard to resolve or pin down as it is to denounce or  
displace elsewhere? 
 
Several years previously, Freud had written a paper on the potential value (and limits) of  
psychoanalytic procedures in the field of legal evidence, one which includes a much earlier record  
of his attitude to Jung, to the Zurich School and to the theory of complexes. Writing in 1906,  
Freud seems more approving of the term ‘complex’ derived from this particular origin, although  
his admiration is perhaps tempered by a background of implied criticism. Freud entertains the idea  
that once knowledge of a specific complex is developed, one might use associative or stimulus- 
words in a legal setting to establish whether the person under examination is a sufferer or not.  
Freud relates this technique to that of the magistrate, who might use his own knowledge in leading  
ways to establish guilt or otherwise. This somewhat tentative connection between the fields of 
psychoanalysis and law is further pursued. (Tentative, because Freud later acknowledges—albeit  
not without the possibility of irony—a key difference between the psychoanalyst and the legal  
practitioner, whereby the latter may not as a rule take the subject by surprise). Indeed, it is  
sustained as Freud itemizes the rather involved processes through which the subject might commit  
‘psychical self-betrayal’ (Freud, 1906: 107). The basic ground of comparison, having to do with  
the exposure of what has previously been kept secret, nonetheless remains susceptible to a  
critically differentiating factor.  While the criminal deliberately hides the truth from the court, the  
patient—the hysteric, say—has no more prior knowledge of what he conceals than does the  
analyst (and sometimes less). Nevertheless, Freud stays with the idea that psychoanalysis is just  
another kind of detective work, and argues that when the spontaneity of the associative technique  
begins to run aground, this provides evidence that repression is at work, and that the analyst may  
be on to something. Each hesitation or obfuscation is an expression, and thus evidence, of  
resistance. Here, then, delay in reaction-time is as critical for psychoanalysis as it is for the  
courtroom in the suspicion of ‘guilt’, while odd or ambiguous answers also betray the guilty  
subject. Equally, when the answer to a question asked for a second or third time is altered, the  
nature of that alteration and that inconsistency provides vital clues which may aid the legal  
investigation as much as the analytic process. It is only a pity, suggests Freud, that the tempo of  
courtroom proceedings is that much faster than the laborious work of analysis, since this deprives  
the law of some of the benefits enjoyed by the latter.  
 
If the connection between legal questioning and psychoanalysis starts out on a rather tentative  
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footing, however, Freud persists in his keenness to demonstrate appreciation of their different  
spheres and activities. The criminal deliberately conceals his guilt, while the patient’s  
secretiveness is not intentional; the criminal consciously adopts an adversarial relationship to the  
law, whereas the patient seeks to cooperate with the analyst.  However, these distinctions—aimed  
at qualifying the very connection that Freud began by pursuing, and thereby establishing some  
limits to the value of psychoanalytic techniques in the field of law—remain highly questionable.  
For who is to say that the patient is never deliberately resistant to the forays of analysis? Is it so  
easy to draw the line between resistances that are merely altogether unconscious and those in  
which the subject consciously participates? Equally, who is to say that criminals do not  
sometimes wish to betray themselves? Freud of all people should be capable of disputing such  
simplistic distinctions. This is important because Freud goes on to write: 
 
The aim of psycho-analysis is absolutely uniform in every case: complexes have to be 
uncovered which have been repressed because of feelings of unpleasure and which produce 
signs of resistance if an attempt is made to bring them into consciousness.  The resistance is 
as it were localized; it arises AT the frontier between unconscious and conscious. In your 
cases [i.e., legal cases—SMW] what is concerned is a resistance which comes entirely from 
consciousness. (Freud, 1906: 112) 
 
The dissimilarity between the practice of law and of psychoanalysis therefore comes down to a 
particular conception of repression—for Freud, the very origin of the complex—that provides 
the latter (psychoanalysis) with both its raison d’etre and modus operandi, while placing the 
former (law) decisively outside of the analytic scene. But if the differences that Freud seeks to 
establish between the criminal and the patient are arguably untenable, then this distinction 
begins to collapse and, in the process, the conception of repression ‘proper’ to psychoanalysis is 
open to question. And if this is the case, then Freud’s attempt to retain usage of the term 
‘complex’ beyond or outside of its Jungian sense, by insisting on the critical specificity of 
repression as he himself understands it, surely becomes less convincing all of a sudden. Once 
more, the idea of a ‘complex’, much less than being clarified through various psychoanalytic 
treatments, begins to impose its own problematics—one might say, its own ‘complex’—on 
psychoanalysis itself.          
 
Freud, of course, is not so slow to sense such difficulties. Within just a few lines, he is to be 
found reminding the legal profession of a further complication that they must face, namely that 
the accused may behave in ways that seem to imply guilt but which might in fact arise from 
psychic abnormalities, for instance neuroses.  Here, then, Freud partly abandons his previous 
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distinction—upon which the specificity or propriety of both psychoanalysis and repression was 
constructed—between the accused and the patient: the subject in the dock may be either guilty 
or unwell, or both at once. But Freud relinquishes the difference only in part, since he fails to 
acknowledge the obvious corollary, namely that the analysand may also be ‘guilty’ in the sense 
that Freud had previously assigned purely to the criminal, and that as a consequence his own 
idea both of psychoanalysis and repression might need a second look.  The ‘frontier’ between 
deliberate or conscious acts and the ‘unconscious’ is acknowledged as simultaneously a 
complicated point of connection, yet this insight is not fully grasped, far from it. Once its 
supposed qualifications begin to crumble, what starts out as a tentative relation between 
psychoanalysis and law is transformed into a much more telling interaction, not just because we 
appreciate that despite the rulebook legal practitioners may in fact cruelly bait highly vulnerable 
people of uncertain responsibility (i.e., that law may break its own rules); but because we also 
become aware that the scene of analysis—and the drama of the ‘complex’—may not be all that 
Freud imagines (i.e., that psychoanalysis’s own rules, laws and boundaries are not themselves 
inviolable).
4
 
 
How, then, to get to the bottom of this problem of the ‘complex’ (assuming that such a thing was  
ever possible)? Let’s begin by reviewing some of the earliest associations of the term found in  
the psychological writing we’d identify with Freud, beginning with Studies on Hysteria (Freud,  
1895), parts of which were of course contributed by Breuer. In fact, on the subject of complexes  
Breuer seems keener on the word than Freud, and more liable to use it as a proper noun rather  
than merely a descriptive term. But across the texts found in Studies on Hysteria, a ‘complex’  
emerges as that which may arise on the basis of an assemblage of associated ideas, ideas that  
might not be—indeed, are highly unlikely to be—consistent with one another, or, for that matter,  
intelligible in relation to one another. While some features of the complex may well be registered  
at a conscious level (a somewhat Jungian idea that Freud will later have cause to dispute more  
explicitly), by definition the general structure is itself therefore formed of elements that are not  
consciously appreciated by the subject, and that cannot be faced all at once, if they can be faced at  
all. A complex thus seems to be made up of interconnected yet frequently contradictory or  
irreconcilable materials, and it takes shape on the basis of interactions between its constituent  
parts that, while they are almost impossible to control or stop, nonetheless remain consistently and  
inevitably liable to repression and resistance of just the kind that Freud will increasingly insist  
upon. For analysis, what is at stake in the appreciation or treatment of a complex is thus a move  
beyond the more tangible or visible components of the complex, those that alert us to the 
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possibility of a certain psychic condition, towards a retrieval of its highly complicated structure  
or form. This is easier said than done, however, if we recall that by its very nature a complex  
arises on the strength of powerful tensions, forceful repressions and highly charged resistances  
that are incredibly difficult to overcome, let alone appreciate. 
 
In some of his first remarks on the notion of a complex, slender and embryonic though they may  
be, Freud seems to associate complexes—or at any rate a ‘complex’ situation—with difficult or  
problematic emotional states such as anxiety and grief, and with painful and unresolved  
memories. Breuer, meanwhile, notes the intrusive quality of unconscious materials, and  
an unhealthy yet unchecked compulsiveness where the associative tendency is concerned.    
He remarks that the complex is characterized by involved trains of thought or chains of  
associations in which key elements nevertheless resist associative contact. While complexes are  
described here as ‘ideational’ (i.e., as formations of ideas) it is nevertheless hard for the reader to  
decide whether distinct and discrete ideas—ideas as such—are brought into contact with one  
another to form a complex; or whether the complex is itself the precondition and setting for the  
‘ideas’ in their specific (and typically non-self-identical) form. Two questions arise  
from this state of affairs: not only ‘what is an idea?’, but also ‘what is a complex?’ if the latter  
may be constituted by that which it constitutes as such? 
 
However, despite these conceptual difficulties in the determination of a ‘complex’, within the  
space of just a few years one may detect in Freud’s texts a perhaps surprising willingness to  
name certain complexes, even a rather florid enthusiasm for such activity.  One may think of  
The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900), among other writings. For example, Freud feels able  
to speak of an ‘eating complex’, a ‘prostitute complex’ (and later on, here and in other places, a  
‘hunger complex’, a ‘masturbation complex’, an ‘excretory complex’ or ‘constipation complex’ or  
‘lumf complex’, a ‘horse complex’, an ‘infantile complex’, a ‘death complex’, a ‘love-hate  
complex’, the ‘sexual complex’, and so on). But perhaps most interestingly, the Freud of this  
period alludes to the ‘parental complex’, closely allied to his famous ideas about  
the castration complex and the Oedipus complex. This naming tendency may seem odd, given the  
original conception of a complex as an intricately woven and perhaps impossibly nebulous matrix  
composed of disparate and indeed irreconcilable elements through which associative chains run in  
ways that seem resistant to a unified perspective, or to a dominant term or a single idea as such.  
And yet to ‘master’ a complex, as Freud sometimes puts it, entails for him reconstituting  
something of its structural composition.  To retain its coherence as such, a structure—as Derrida  
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(1978) and others have taught us—must be determined and controlled by a key element that is not  
contingent upon the vicissitudes of structural relations, even though structures are in essence  
defined by relationality. In other words, the structurality of a structure depends on an element that  
is, as it were, non- or a-structural, an element that is by definition at once central to the structure’s  
possibility and yet exempt from (or outside) its contingent structural interactions. (The difficulty  
of the complex’s ‘structure’ is compounded by the question of the resistance to association  
offered by some of the unconscious elements, since they would seem both to curtail the non-finite  
or compulsive associativity that might otherwise threaten the structural formation or structurality  
of the ‘complex’ while nevertheless acting as precisely its enabling condition.) In these terms, it is  
especially interesting that the ‘parental complex’ and its derivative or developed forms—in other  
words, its family members—begin to take centre-stage where the whole idea of a ‘Freudian’  
complex is concerned, since the very notion of the ‘parental complex’ as it takes shape within  
psychoanalysis is at the same time precisely the problem of the complex itself: namely, that of a  
seemingly interminable, ungovernable series of relations in want of a proper or family name, a  
base or basis, a master or head(ing), as an impossible yet necessary injunction.  Put differently,  
this suggests that the name given to a ‘complex’ may not resolve the question of its interpretation  
so much as add but a further layer or wrinkle to the complicated problem with which it confronts  
us.  
 
As we have already seen, despite his frequent enthusiasm for naming complexes Freud  
nevertheless suggests in subsequent texts that we should be somewhat wary of the word, since it  
is at risk of substituting itself as an improper name for the sharper and more robust categories of  
resistance and repression. (Thus, it is also at risk of becoming part of an over-simplified  
psychological terminology that is susceptible to crude popularizing uses.) One might venture to  
say, however, that the term resists or even represses that which it improperly names: resistance or  
repression itself. Through the very act of misnaming it enacts what it misnames. It performs what  
it also represses or resists (resisting resistance, repressing repression). The relationship of the  
complex to the name—a relationship that one might hope to clarify in order to resolve the  
question ‘what is a complex?’, or at any rate to identify a possible answer—thus once more  
partakes of the problem it seems to name. It seems that the very idea of a complex—if such a  
thing were even possible—makes us crave an organising term or a ‘name’ which it perhaps  
inevitably eludes even as its interaction with this term or name helps to clarify precisely the  
problem of the complex’s elusiveness. Throughout his references to the notion of a ‘complex’,  
Freud is fond of alluding to the ‘nuclear’ aspect or ‘nucleus’ of the complex, but for the reasons  
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we are describing this term itself surely achieves only a highly ambivalent standing in relation to  
the concept it seeks to supplement.  
 
Equally, Freud’s own allusions to his ‘professional’ or ‘personal’ complexes may do little more  
than seek to confer upon a psychoanalytic discourse of the ‘complex’ both the authority and  
glamour of the name of its father-figure, in a way that surely has an ironic connection to the idea  
of a ‘father complex’ that remains a family member among related terms such as ‘castration’ and  
‘Oedipus’, which in turn give us Freud’s most protracted engagements with the very notion  
of a ‘complex’.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, in ‘The Psychopathology of Everyday  
Life’ (Freud, 1901), one can therefore trace the incidence of the term ‘complex’ through a series  
of uses on Freud’s part that lead from the ‘personal’ to the ‘professional’ to the ‘family complex’.  
Here, patterns of identification, association, dispersal and deferral—so characteristic of the  
problem of the ‘complex—themselves pull the text, and its author, in more than one direction. In  
this game of identity and difference, such twists and turns are of course additionally complicated  
in Freud’s oeuvre by the attribution of the term to Jung, as we’ve already seen. Freud’s allusion to  
a ‘personal’ complex, and indeed its motivation, is therefore highly questionable (even if his  
attribution of the term ‘elsewhere’ seems to carry highly personal motivations). For how could a  
complex be ‘personal’ any more than an ‘idea’ might be single?  
 
On a similar front, while on certain occasions Freud distinguishes the psychologically  
‘normal’ from deviant forms of psychic life, at other times he alludes to complexes suffered as  
much by the healthy as by the sick, once more unsettling the project of delineating the ‘complex’  
in any proper sense.  The effect here is, unsurprisingly, not dissimilar to the upshot of Freud’s  
highly questionable demarcation of the criminal and the patient in his 1906 text on psychoanalysis  
and the law. Equally, the idea of a ‘stimulus-word’ that might unlock a complex, an idea  
pioneered by the Zurich School but entertained by Freud at least partially in the 1906 lecture,  
surely only reactivates the aporia of the complex’s ‘structure’ just as much as the effect of  
naming. Where complexes are concerned, as we have seen the family of terms which might  
otherwise scaffold a certain coherence around a principal figure is itself aberrant or errant to the  
extent that the ‘complex’ also somewhat depropriates the head(ing), the cap or the capital letter,  
the correct term or the proper or ‘master’ name. But if it seems to castrate, the complex also  
sutures, stitches (i.e., it associates, although by cutting as much as joining, as Breuer himself  
insightfully observed). Yet what is re-connected is not simply sewn back together, which would  
presume an original unity to be restored; but is instead worked into potentially new forms that  
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prevent masterful ‘unlocking’ of the kind offered by a standard key. This idea of ‘unlocking’ is  
one that Freud himself is often resistant to, dismissing it as an unfortunate effect of the vulgar  
popularizations of psychological discourse, just as he had done concerning the devalued usage of  
the idea of a complex. Thus, the notion of a stimulus-word as the proposed point of entry to the  
entire ‘complex’ falters on the basis of the characteristics of a ‘complex’ that it precisely seeks to  
overcome.  In other words, such a notion may be less an effective solution or approach to  
complexes themselves, that a questionable response to the problem of the complex more  
generally, an unconvincing if rather predictable effect of their complexity. 
 
These comments of mine on the notion of the ‘complex’ arise in part from engaging with those  
writings of Freud that precede texts published during and after the first decade of the twentieth  
century; texts where the notions of the ‘castration complex’ and the ‘Oedipus complex’ really  
come to the fore and are consciously developed in terms of their (capital) importance. Such  
investigation on my part establishes, then, the rather uncertain—maybe even unconscious— 
background against which the usage of the term may be evaluated. In ‘The Dissolution of the  
Oedipus Complex’ (Freud, 1924), meanwhile, we find the perhaps inevitable corollary of the  
complex’s inner problematics, played out less at the beginning of complexes than at their end.  
Here, Freud looks at two possibilities. On the one hand, he considers the idea that  
complexes are eventually destroyed through their lack of success, psychologically speaking. In  
other words, they founder on the basis of their own internal impossibility, which is in the end  
sufficiently shocking or striking in psychic terms to bring about just such a dramatic and decisive  
decline.
5
 The other view Freud entertains, however, is that the complex’s collapse occurs when  
the time has come for it simply to disintegrate. If these alternatives sound similar in a certain way,  
their difference is also somewhat obvious. For in one scenario, it is as though the complex  
facilitates a progressive psychological state, and as such enjoys a more or less functional status,  
not really resisting that which supersedes it; while in the alternative perspective, the complex  
combusts rather suddenly and brutally in such a way as to make possible—albeit fortuitously— 
another situation that presumably the complex itself would otherwise resist, had it the resources to  
do so. However, Freud’s consideration of these two possibilities (in the end, he dismisses both)  
perhaps captures perfectly both the complexity of psychoanalysis’s relationship to the term in  
question (is it a productive or on the contrary a resistant category, indeed might it be both?); but  
also the somewhat double and ambiguous relationship of complexes themselves to the resistance  
that for Freud establishes their defining possibility and conceptual integrity. Even at the point it  
seems to pass out of existence, whether melting away or violently imploding, the complex  
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therefore puts psychoanalysis, at the beginning of its own thought, in a situation where it remains  
confronted by its own ‘complex complex’, as it were.  
 
IV 
 
When we talk about complexity theory, Freudian complexes or the ‘military-industrial’ (or some  
other, semi-equivalent) complex, obviously we are not talking about quite the same things, despite  
the fact that certain connections are obvious and well documented. As I noted earlier, the  
terminological cluster around the word ‘complex’ not only constitutes an important feature of the  
self-identity we inherit from the previous century, but invites critical analysis of the  
linkages between developments in the realms of techno-scientific knowledge and the ‘political’  
field itself. I’ve done little more than to point out certain internal and distributive tensions in the  
way ‘complexity’ has taken hold, but also moments of curious—or perhaps not so curious—drift,  
for instance when a phrase owing its import to a ‘structural’ perspective gets ‘psychologized’.  
What I would say, though, is that while complexity theory and discourse (which overspills the  
hard sciences into inquiries in the social sciences and humanities) may imagine itself capable of  
leaving other usages behind as simply archaic, irrelevant, or non-scientific, it might still be  
valuable to assess the trouble the word has caused this past hundred years or so. For Freud, in  
particular, this has to do with the extent to which the term resists its own utilisation as an object or  
form of analysis, at once gaining and losing its specificity on precisely this basis. If the problem  
of the complex, or of what is complex, comes down to the formation of a complex, if the two  
amount to the same thing (i.e., to if to talk about complexes invariably means having one), then  
what emerges is a certain quasi-‘triangulated’6 dimension–whether we call it heuristic,  
phenomenological, psychological, or by some other name—at once complexifying what  
is ‘complex’, and yet also undermining its capacity for ‘complexity’ in a certain way. This quasi- 
‘triangulated’ dimension, in other words, forms the resistant limit of complexity itself (a limit that  
is far from merely a constraint), enabling or rather extending what it also renders impossible or  
unattainable.  
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1 While complex problems have been studied since long before the advent of the  
twentieth century, they do seem to have a ‘modern’ quality. Statistical physics,  
information theory and non-linear dynamics derive those equations that support the  
modelling of complex systems, but such systems are used to model processes in a range of  
disciplines and multi-disciplinary fields including computer science, cybernetics and A.I., 
economics, meteorology and climate studies, biology, chemistry and physics. Complexity  
theory, in its various forms, is itself complexly connected to systems theory, network theory,  
chaos theory, and research on adaptive systems that gained ground in the post-war period.  
Perhaps most famously, during the 1980s the Santa Fe Institute (SFI) was established to study  
the fundamental principles of complex adaptive systems, including physical, computational,  
biological, and social systems. (See also my note below.) More broadly, there is a large  
literature devoted to the use of complexity theory in understanding organizational change,  
and in management studies. One could readily trace connections throughout the latter half of  
the twentieth century in particular between between these fields of study and the knowledges  
they produce, and certain developments in the technologico-industrial-ecomico- 
administrative-political field (one could extend or modify this series, no doubt), most notably  
in North America.      
2 There is, of course, evidence of quite diverse usages of the term 'complexity' that can be  
found in relation to the defence and security (not merely ‘military’) ‘complexes’ of North  
Atlantic societies since the dissolution of the Cold War. On the 'edutainment military  
industrial complex', see the work of James Der Derian, especially his book Virtuous War:  
Mappying the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Complex (London: Routledge, 2
nd
  
ed., 2009); see also the extensive discussion concerning the promotion and application of the  
move from cybernetics to complexity in Michael Dillon and Julian Reid's book, The Liberal  
Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live (London, Routledge, 2009). See also Stephen Stockell  
and Adam Muir, ‘The Military-Entertainment Complex: A new facet of information warfare’,   
The Fibreculture Journal 1 (2003), on-line at http://one.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-004-the-
military-entertainment-complex-a-new-facet-of-information-warfare; and also Tim  
Lenoir and Henry Lowood, Theaters of War: The Military-Entertainment Complex  
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(California: Stanford University Press, 2002). Reference might also be made to Dillon’s other  
work including ‘Poststructuralism, Complexity and Poetics’, Theory Culture and Society 17.5  
(2000): 1-26, and Biopolitics of Security: A Political Analytic of Finitude (London:  
Routledge, 2015). Complexity discourse also has widespread usage in the literature on  
complex emergencies that has developed in the last twenty years. See for example Louise  
Amoore, The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security Beyond Probability (Durham: Duke  
University Press, 2013). Such work is useful in balancing the psychological with the techno- 
scientific and wider policy related popularity of complexity discourse, and it links also to the  
complexity-inflected literature connected to the Santa Fe Institute, Military Universities and  
Defence and Security research agencies like DARPA over the last twenty years or so. More  
generally, one might refer here as a primary context to the wider securitization of western  
societies following 9/11, the advent of the so-called war on terror and the widespread  
preoccupation with complex emergencies and related strategies of resilience. 
3 Sigmund Freud, ‘On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement’ (1914), The Standard  
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud XIV, ed. and trans. James  
Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis), 7-66. For this  
particular passage, see 29-30. 
4
 Freud concludes his lecture by advocating that legal investigation, in order to  
benefit from the insights offered by psychoanalysis, would need to test the  
psychological approach outside of actual criminal trials where the analytic situation  
could not be properly reproduced. Such experiments, in other words, could not yet  
provide the basis for the ‘practical administration of justice’ (114), but should instead be  
conducted through dummy exercises based on real cases, with the findings withheld  
from courts and prevented from influencing their decisions. (Only through a  
painstaking comparison between legal and psychoanalytic findings after many years  
could the value of such experiments be determined, Freud suggests.) This weirdly  
hybrid situation imposed upon the law, as if to recognize a certain grey area between  
psychology and justice, seems nevertheless to exempt psychoanalysis in all its  
propriety and purity from the bizarrely mixed scenario it demands.  And yet one  
wonders whether—as the concluding testament of this lecture and final answer to the  
question of psychoanalysis and law—it sounds sufficiently odd to raise questions in  
the mind of any lawyer, as if Freud might be hiding something.   
5
 By way of comparison, in ‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction  
Between the Sexes’ (S.E. XIX, 248-258), Freud writes: ‘The Oedipus complex, however, is such  
an important thing that the manner in which one enters and leaves it cannot be without its  
effects. In boys… the complex is not simply repressed, it is literally smashed to pieces by the  
shock of threatened castration. It libidinal cathexes are abandoned, desexualized and in part  
sublimated; its objects are incorporated into the ego, where they form the nucleus of the super- 
ego and give that new structure its characteristic qualities’ (257).  
6 I put this term in inverted commas as if to provoke disbelief that the ‘phenomenon’  
I am seeking to describe might either be reduced to the numerical consistency or  
self-identity of the ‘three’, or that it might be explained simply from a ‘perspectival’  
point of view; whereas in fact the problematic I am trying to develop in fact engulfs  
such stabilizing props or supplements.      
